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Making American Places: Civic Engagement Rightly Understood
Ted V. McAllister

Place is about limits and defending the importance of place is really a species
of repression. There is much truth in this line of reasoning. For so many people in
history, place was either such a basic fact of their lives that they never came to see it
conceptually or, if they did, saw it as a sort of prison. In villages or neighborhoods
all over the world and throughout history—as diverse as 15th century France or
early 20th century Tennessee (or, for that matter, contemporary Afghanistan)--the
experience of place has often been oppressive. It is an experience of prying eyes,
leaving no privacy, no relief from the tedium of small expectation, no meaningful
escape to a larger world of possibility—not even a reasonable hope of a liberated
imagination to dream of other possibilities. For so many of our ancestors, place was
just another word for hopelessness.
Do we really need a place in the world today? Isn’t the world itself our
“place”—our global community? Perhaps for previous generations, the world was
too large to be a place and so they were forced to find or carve out a little space to
call their own, a provincial home for protection against unruly nature and lawless
strangers. We moderns are sufficiently liberated from the un-chosen restraints of
our ancestors for we have largely mastered space with transportation and
communication technologies. Who needs the walls of their fortress cities against the
barbarians? Certainly for many, portable wealth and countless “connected”
locations around the globe liberate them from any meaningful dependence on one
place, one society, one polis. We have escaped the limits of geography.
This presumed liberation from physical space (or at least from connection to
specific physical spaces) also suggests deeper forms of liberation, including giving
ourselves to the creative urge to re-form, re-invent, our identities. In this sense, the
very idea of place is restrictive. Whereas we might once have said that someone
should know his place (which, beyond the racist overtones this language has taken,
suggests that we ought to play roles that are given to us, that we did not choose), we
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now assert that a person should find space in the world for his particular
experiment in living. Because we are no longer bound by inherited roles or even
strong familial or social pressures to fulfill the expectations that often come from a
strong sense of place, we prefer to think of the world as a space big enough for us to
find our true selves or create new selves. By mastering physical space we turn the
world into metaphorical space for individual expression. Liberation from specific
places also means release from bonds of social institutions like family or church.
The expansiveness of this world allows us to create or join whatever social
networks we choose, designing a social, political, artistic, sexual life that reaches
from Little Rock to Timbuktu, from our laptop to the ether.
Perhaps the most overlooked form of liberation promised by the gurus of
modern emancipation comes in the form of historylessness. Characteristically,
humans have a “place” in history, the felt presence of ancestors, of inherited culture,
a sense that as individuals and groups they play an appointed role in a story not of
their making. But as the pace of technological, social, and cultural change reaches a
certain critical point of acceleration, humans experience their environment in a way
that exposes no clear dependence on the distant or middle past. The ways of our
grandparents are so hopelessly ill-suited to the contemporary environment that one
might well consider knowledge of history a useless form of antiquarianism. The
conquest of space is also the conquest of history, if not of time. No longer bound to a
specific place, one can more easily forget its history as well as ignore the history
attending any temporary places one might later inhabit. We have not only turned
place into space but we have abandoned history for the ever-present now. As I will
argue later, to the degree that we live free from the constraints of the cultural and
political spaces that we call communities and of the grounding role of history, we
sever ourselves from the creative energies of richly encumbered lives. This form of
liberation leads to a form of powerlessness.
Like most of the contributors to this volume, I believe that the modern
liberation of the individual from the constraints of place constitutes as much a
limitation as an emancipation. To put the claim bluntly, place constrains but it also
empowers and a radical emancipation from place does not lead to creative freedom
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but to boredom, emotional and spiritual fragmentation, and tyranny. Thus, it is
important to create, preserve, improve real places for real people (not abstract
individuals of indeterminate identity) to find attachments, to empower them to
engage meaningfully and well with neighbors toward collective purposes, and to
help them understand their particular role in the larger story of humanity. The task
must be a constructive one, active rather than passive. It is not a matter of simply
not getting in the way of communities but rather of thinking more positively about
policies that can protect, cultivate, or create healthy places as lively habitats for
families, businesses, civil society, and for citizens. To affirm that America needs
healthy places and Americans need a place in the world requires an intellectual,
theoretical defense of the importance of place to human flourishing but it also
requires a serious reflection on the policies that fit with that philosophical and
anthropological vision.
But, is it possible that Americans (those beings formed out of the uniquely
American experience) love space more than place? Our cultural mythology is
particularly rich with the liberating power of wide-open spaces, the awesome
beauty of trackless wilderness, the adventure of the frontiersman un-tethered to
place, the romance and fresh possibilities of the open road, the power of placeless
space to inspire self-discovery and creativity. We are often in need of “space” to
clear our heads—space to breathe when obligations make us claustrophobic. Many
of us need to put space between ourselves and our loved ones, lest we lose our
identity in the tight bonds of familial or communal affection. We talk about real and
metaphorical space in terms of freedom, creativity, opportunity, and a profound
individualism—emotionally connecting “space” with our very identities, our sense
of self. It seems that without “space” we cannot find ourselves or create ourselves.
Space can also be forbidding, mysterious, dark—the source for experiences
of ennui, loss, and fear. Driving through the vast open spaces of the Great Plains or
the western deserts produces, in many a sensitive soul, a sense of spiritual nausea.
The horizon is vast, the terrain appears unchanging, time slows down as miles go by
without detectable landmarks. One can easily feel insignificant, small, meaningless
in such a space—a space that bears little trace of human contact and evokes no
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sense whatsoever of history. With little effort the sojourner through such spaces
meditates on the formless, the timeless, on the infinite—that is, on the terror of
boundlessness.
However much we need space for adventure, to create, to change, to grow,
we need, perhaps even more, boundaries that give form or structure to our lives,
that turn space into something knowable, safe, and that help form the very
architecture that preserves memory. What is needed is an art of placemaking, for
we can say with G.K. Chesterton that “Art consists of limitation. The most beautiful
part of any picture is the frame.” The art of turning space into place is the art of
limiting in order to create. Indeed, American history is as much the tale of placemaking as of seeking space. We Americans are peerless in the practice of this art
and we have made America itself into a “place”, a huge but not boundless place that
incorporates both a built environment and open-spaces into a meaningful whole.
America is bound by shared history, language, cultural affinities, as well as collective
purposes that emerge from democratic participation—from civic engagement
rightly understood. And yet it is reasonable to argue that America is a place only
because of the rich and robust nature of its many different and distinct places.
Loyalty and attachment to “America” requires, in most cases, complex and almost
invisible cords of affections to particular people, local institutions, and to very
particular places.
In American lore, devotion to these particular places, or to the insistence of
building such places, is almost as great as our myth of intrepid individuals bound for
virgin land. We celebrate foundings, which, among other things, are acts of turning
space into place. The Separatists (so-called Pilgrims) established order in the wilds
of America with the Mayflower Compact. At nearly the same time, the Puritans
created a robust social and political order on their “errand into the wilderness.”
What was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 but the imposition of order on space—
the mechanism by which space can be turned into social and political places
favorable to human needs? The United States Constitution was the product of a
deliberate and deliberative effort to create a new political structure to help solidify a
single, multifarious, coherent place. Every story of the lone frontiersman unfolds
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against the backdrop of one of the greatest place-making adventures in human
history—the constant settling and organizing of towns that brought order and
stability to previously lawless spaces. Devotion to place was an important part of
the story of the Civil War, and how it was fought. Fascination with what kinds of
places we could build and what those places could do to and for us pushed urban
development of the twentieth century to new heights, governed the development of
the post 1945 crabgrass frontier of suburbia, cultivated the passion for building a
transportation infrastructure, and informed all manner of developments made
possible by the communication revolution of the last several decades. Say what you
will about the American love for space and freedom, but few peoples have shown
the same genius for creating places and order.
Famously, Edmund Burke argued that “to be attached to the subdivision, to
love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it
were) of all public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed
towards a love to our country, and to mankind.”1 Much is at stake in Burke’s claim,
and what he claims goes against the trajectory of modern liberalism and the most
current tendencies of American society. Burke would have us believe that a healthy
patriotism is rooted in deep attachment to particular and flawed people rather than
devotion to abstract principles. We must belong to something that we can
experience directly, to people and institutions (and ideas or beliefs that are
embodied in people and institutions) that require, daily, small acts of loyalty and
reciprocity, in order to prepare us to love well and moderately something that is too
large to experience directly.
Despite being among the most mobile peoples in history and despite the
great expanse of space that shaped their imagination, culture, and politics, the
American people have largely lived true to Burke’s dictum “to love the little
platoon”—even if in America that required us to create continuously these platoons.
In the abstract, one has good reason to doubt that robust localism can coexist with
high levels of mobility. In this sense, Americans created something that defies
1

Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J.G.A. Pocock
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), 41.
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expectations and, perhaps, is not repeatable for other cultures. The cultural reasons
for this success are debatable and beyond the scope of this essay, but it is enough to
marvel at the accomplishment, particularly at a time when many suspect that
contrary trends pose new and grave threats to this form of ordered liberty, this
species of moderated patriotism, and this kind of devotion to place that overcomes
the tendencies toward dangerous and narrow provincialism.
If the ability to create, to preserve, and to improve “place” is necessary to the
health of a people, then serious reflection on what we might call “the problem of
place” is appropriate for citizens and policy-makers. The natural tendency of
modern democracy is toward despotism. Modern democracy does not, on its own,
encourage a political life and therefore does not encourage people to think of
themselves as citizens. If those who advocate civic engagement mean by that phrase
a deep citizen investment in the deliberations of the community about shared
purposes and ends—about the kind of place they want to create together—then
they will have to develop strategies that check the natural tendencies of modern
democracy.
In her excellent book, Democracy on Trial, Jean Elshtain stresses the need for
what she calls “democratic dispositions,” which include a willingness or perhaps
even eagerness to act with others toward shared purposes, to compromise, to
converse, and to understand one’s unique life as imbedded in a skein of
relationships that help constitute one’s distinctive personhood. The maintenance of
these dispositions is a necessary condition, it seems, to preserving the civic virtues
of “sobriety, rectitude, hard work, and familial and community obligations.”2
What Elshtain calls democratic dispositions are, by my way of thinking, really
habits that begin by “doing” and then venerating that way of doing. In other words,
these are not virtues that one necessarily expects in a democracy, but rather habits
that make possible the rare combination of democracy and self-reliance. These
habits modify and moderate democracy, rather than express its inherent nature.
The savage instincts of democracy, to use Tocqueville’s phrase, encourage people to

2

Jean Elshtain, Democracy on Trial, (New York: Basic Books, 1995), see chapter 1.
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withdraw into an intensely private world and to see the world from the narrow
perspective of their own self-interest, crudely understood. Disconnected from
public obligations, having come to think of individualism as a virtue, the democrat
sees only his own small world of family and close associates and then the
abstractions of nation or humanity—the rich world of political and civil associations
in between are invisible to him.3
For Tocqueville, the logical end of democracy left to its “savage instincts” is
an administrative regime that oversees infantilized individuals. In his chapter on
democratic poetry, Tocqueville emphasizes that equality reorients human
consciousness by destroying the middle ground between the individual and the
broadest abstractions, leaving the person with something very small to
contemplate—the self—and something too vast to comprehend—humankind. He
tends to understand the latter in relation to what he knows about the former, but in
order for this to work he must assume an abstract idea of the human; thus, being a
human whose nature is universally applicable to the species, he can look inside to
his own nature to understand the whole of which he is a part.4
Thus the un-moderated democrat—the one who lacks the democratic
dispositions that Elshtain so cherishes—makes a virtue out of indifference.
Typically, he will say “who am I to say” how some other person should live, thus
implying that he operates with an expansive openness to his fellow citizen while
more truthfully he is undermining any real relationship—antagonistic or
otherwise—that might require meaningful social and political engagement. So long
as most “public” matters are really administrative matters, which require the
individual to appeal to the government directly for redress, then there is no context
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Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. and ed. Harvey C. Mansfield
and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 7. See also the
last three chapters of Volume 2 where he explores these savage instincts when
unmoderated. Hereafter cited as DIA.
4 This description comes from my essay, “The Tocqueville Problem and the Nature
of American Conservatism” (found in Anamnesis: A Journal For the Study of
Tradition, Place, and ‘Things Divine,’ Volume 1, Number 1, 2011, pp. 64-94). In that
essay I explore this theme in greater depth, particularly pp. 75-79.
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for robust political and civic life. Democracy, at this point, is about administration
rather than self-rule, about individualism rather than self-reliance.
This un-moderated democrat will recognize few obligations to people or
institutions. Confining his life to those most like himself—often in lifestyle
enclaves—he has no reason to care about those who aren’t like him. Meanwhile,
this democrat will love humanity and will traffic in self-evident abstractions—this
both establish his command of universal truths (and therefore his standing as a
citizen) and provide him with the vocabulary by which to engage in political speech
that requires no particular, concrete political knowledge.
The point is that democratic instincts destroys the middle ground between
the individual and humanity, and the democratic dispositions about which Elshtain
writes are the primary means by which individuals enter into public life. If
voluntary associations, mediating institutions, and robust local politics help form
citizens who are capable civic virtues—who can at a minimum operate with selfinterest rightly understood—then we must pay attention to how Americans form
the habits of self-rule, of gregariousness, and most important, the habit of serious
conversation and compromise.
Most of the conversation about this problem focuses on the decline of civil
society, the decline in voluntary associations, the retreat of certain forms of religious
engagement and the relative decline of local and state politics at the expense of the
administrative state. But there is a very complex relationship between the
institutional arrangements that allow or even foster these democratic dispositions,
and the deeper social and cultural forces that give us the desire to participate
meaningfully in our self-governance. To design our political world so as to
encourage the growth and development of both localist politics and mediating
institutions requires that people want such arrangements and that they prefer the
messy adventure of self-rule to the comfortable slavery of the administrative state.
At least in the past, Americans have wanted these arrangements and have
accepted self-rule as something noble. Americans have, as a result, cultivated the
democratic virtues that people like Jean Elshtain and Christopher Lasch have
cheered even as they worried that democratic virtues are, in our day, waning. What
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exempted, for a time at least, Americans from the logic of modern democracy and
what has changed to make citizens less enthralled with the ideals of self-rule? Part
of the answer is the decline of place, or what Tocqueville called the Native Country.
Tocqueville’s first reference to “native country” in Democracy in America
comes in the context of his examination of township freedom. He argued that
freedom didn’t emerge in America in the abstract, as expressed, for instance, in the
Declaration of Independence (a document that he never mentions in his two volume
analysis of American democracy). Nor did American freedom spring from the
freedom of an individual in a state of nature. The most important freedom to appear
in the American wilderness was political freedom—the power and latitude of
citizens to govern themselves without any real interference from outside and more
distant authorities. This political freedom, resting on the authority of a historically
expansive franchise, allowed each town to define their own laws.
American devotion to freedom emerged from social and political life, not
from solitary individuals seeking protection of what is theirs by nature. Because
democracy serves as a solvent to relationships that bind individuals together
through mutual forms of obligation it tends to reduce society to a loose association
of individuals whose connections are products of affection, desire and mutually
agreed to contract. The origins of American freedom are essential to explaining how
democratic instincts were altered by circumstance.
The township, Tocqueville argued (following Aristotle), is a natural form of
association, found throughout history. But, however natural the township, history
knows very few cases where township freedom (the freedom to govern themselves
without interference) lasted long enough to establish deep habits of self-rule and
emotional attachments to their own town as a product of this self-rule. Because
American towns (or at least New England towns), during a long period of salutary
neglect, produced countless and distinct varieties of these self-governing
communities, they also produced a patriotism attached to each town wrought by
these ongoing habits of self-rule. By investing as many citizens as possible in the
regular acts of town government, these towns foster a distinct sense of ownership
or meaningful participation—for their citizens it was truly “our town.”
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The constellation of choices, of laws, of traditions, of habits that emerge from
this robust form of self-rule produces something akin to the “native country.” “In
this manner,” wrote Tocqueville of the multiplication of civic duties, “life in a
township makes itself felt in a way at each instant; it manifests itself each day by the
accomplishment of a duty or the exercise of a right.” The constant and regular
action of political life gives a very specific character, look, even feel to each town.
“The Americans are attached to the city by a reason analogous to the one that makes
inhabitants of the mountains love their country. Among them, the native country
has marked and characteristic features; it has more of a physiognomy than
elsewhere.”5 The shape of a town, its features, its laws, its history, its way of doing
things, gives rise to attachments, to the love of the particular, the eccentric, the
known in ways that no generic expression of a town can produce. Most important of
all, Tocqueville claims that the very particularistic character of each town, and
therefore the means of producing loyalty, sense of duty, love of what is one’s own, is
the product of what we might call civic engagement, rightly understood.
Civic engagement does not mean organized appeals to a distant government
nor does it include any conception in which the citizens construe their relationship
to the government, local or distant, in a manner similar to a client or a customer.
Civic engagement rightly understood, in whatever particular form in takes, requires
that citizens engage as citizens in a deliberative process in which they understand
themselves to be partners in governance. Governance, in this use of the word, is not
limited to, nor must it be primarily, an expression of an organized government that
supplies services. Indeed, the more centralized the administrative functions of the
town become the fewer the opportunities for self-government. A large
administrative apparatus leaves individuals free to live largely un-connected from
social and political arrangements, free to live and let live, free to cultivate a life-style.
Individualists, thus produced, see no need to rely on their fellow citizens or their
closest neighbors or their fellow congregants or their lodge members. The well-
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11
functioning administration (local, state, and federal) liberate them from mutual
dependence and thereby rob them of township freedom.
Civic engagement, therefore, must incorporate a sense of self-reliance rather
than individualism. Habituated to solving problems with their neighbors as those
problems emerge, citizens do not reflexively turn to the administrative state when a
bridge washes out, when the little league needs a place to play, when a family loses
its income. Civic engagement surely includes citizens working through the political
process to make changes (often to get that bridge or baseball diamond built) but it
must also open up social space for other groups, clusters of volunteers, established
non-governmental institutions, to solve problems. The common denominator of all
such civic engagement is investing citizens in the task of governing with some or all
their neighbors and the fostering of a sense of ownership that can only come from
each town developing its distinctive physiognomy.
Tocqueville’s admiration for the way American democracy produced countless
native countries and the salutary effect of this prodigious expression of self-rule also
meant, by contrast, that the risks of tyranny were great to the extent that America
lost this habit of local self-rule. Freedom depends on local self-rule. At the end of
his second volume, as Tocqueville anticipated what would happen if democracy
were to be abandoned to its savage instinct and thereby stripped of its virtues, he
placed the loss of native country as the very expression of despotism:
I want to imagine with what new features despotism could be produce in
the world: I see an innumerable crowd of alike and equal men who
revolve on themselves without repose, procuring the small and vulgar
pleasures with which they fill their souls. Each of them, withdrawn and
apart, is like a stranger to the destiny of all the others; his children and his
particular friends form the whole human species for him; as for dwelling
with his fellow citizens, he is beside them, but he does not see them; he
touches them and does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for
himself alone, and if a family still remains for him, one can at least say that
he no longer has a native country.6
Understood this way, strong places that are distinct, that have a purchase on
the attention and affection of their citizens, that engage at least a large minority in
6

DIA, 663.
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robust self-rule (civic engagement rightly understood), are the necessary condition
for the protection of American freedom. The problem we face today, as I noted
earlier, is that people must want this kind of freedom, this political and civic
involvement that requires them to give up individualism for communal self-reliance.
Healthy freedom, at least in the American story, require places that move citizens to
love where they live, to find themselves part of a local story (history), and to invest
their time and energy in the evolution of a place strange, distinct and perhaps even a
little weird. As Edmund Burke remarked, “to make us love our (native) country, our
(native) country ought to be lovely.”7
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